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NOTES AND COMMENTS
benefit and local interest when other safety or health considera-
tions are not present. The fact that destructive competition might
be present in the foreground does not help the cause of the statute
in such an instance. The court in each case balances the facts on
the side of the public welfare and safety on one side and, on the
other, the advantages to be gained from the free flow of interstate
commerce. To the side that has the greatest weight on the scales,
so goes the favorable decision. Edward R. Holland.
THE STANDARD OIL EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS CASE-A
RETREAT FROM FEXIBLE ANTITRUST LAW?
SECTION 3 of the Clayton Act' provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person.. . to lease or make a sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities
... on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ... of a competitor
or competitors of the ... seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or
contract ... may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly in any line of commerce."
The section was aimed at two basic types of contracts. One was
the tying agreement in which a vendor leases or sells a machine
to a vendee only on the condition that the vendee use therein a
second product usually produced by the vendor. The other was
the requirements (or exclusive) contract wherein the vendee agrees
to buy all his requirements of specified goods exclusively from
the vendor. Section 3 does not purport to render all such contracts
unlawful, but only those contracts the effect of which may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. The
problem, then, becomes one of determining which contracts sub-
stantially lessen competition or tend towards a monopoly.
138 Stat. 731, 15 U. S. C. A., § 14.
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Where, under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the court has found
that the tying agreement or the exclusive contract results in domi-
nance of the market no difficulty has been experienced in declar-
ing the agreement or contract illegal.2 But where dominance of
the market could not be established the courts seem to have ap-
plied two standards which have been called the comparative test
and the quantitative test.3 By the comparative approach the
court has noted the complete competitive effect of the contract on
the industry as a whole; whereas under the quantitative standard
the court has considered only whether the amount of business
removed from competition is "substantial," evidence as to effect
on competition being held irrelevant. The early case of Standard
Fashion Co. v. MagraneHouston Co.4 indicated that in spite of
the Clayton Act's particularistic approach' all of the specified
contracts were not forbidden, but only those which probably would
result in a substantial lessening. A mere possibility was not
enough.
Prior to the 1947 decision of the Supreme Court in International
Salt Co. v. United States' the court seems generally to have applied
the comparative test in cases in which dominance of the market
was not evident.7 That case involved a tying agreement in which
as a condition to the lease of a patented salt machine the lessee
contracted to buy salt exclusively from the lessor. The court indi-
cated that the actual effect of the tying clause upon competition was
irrelevant, concluding that
2 Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 312 U. S. 457
(1941) ; United Shoe Machine Corporation v. United States, 258 U. S. 451 (1922).
" Comment, Section 3 of the Clayton Act-Coexisting Standards ot Legality? 49
CoL. L. REv. 241, 247 (1949).
4 258 U. S. 346 (1922). The Court notes that the Clayton Act operates before the
Sherman Act, seeking to catch the objectional contracts in their incipiency.
5 As contrasted with the Sherman Act, which is more general, 26 Stat. 209, 15
U. S. C. A., §1.
(332 U. S. 392 (1947).
7 See Federal Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining Company, 261 U. S. 463




"... it is unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competition from any sub-
stantial market."'
That decision thus seemed to introduce the quantitative test in
cases involving tying agreements. Left unanswered was the ques-
tion whether the court was prepared to adopt such test with respect
to exclusive contracts.
That question has now been answered in the affirmative by the
Court in the recent decision in Standard Oil of California v. United
States.' Standard-the largest seller of petroleum products in a
seven state West Coast area-had exclusive contracts with inde-
pendent retailers. In 1946 Standard accounted for 23% of the
gasoline sold in the area, but only 6.7% was sold by the retailers
under exclusive contracts. The use of such contracts was prevalent
in the industry; only 1.6% of the retail outlets sold the gasoline
of more than one supplier.'" The government brought suit under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts to enjoin Standard from enforcing
its present contracts, or entering into subsequent ones. The lower
court granted such an injunction, considering a showing of sub-
stantial outlets and value enough to satisfy the qualification to
Section 3, regardless of evidence "on a comparative basis" as to
actual effect on competition.'
On appeal a bare majority of the Court through Justice Frank-
furter affirmed the lower judgment, holding "that competition has
been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce
affected" while "evidence that competitive activity has not actu-
ally declined is inconclusive."12 Justice Jackson, joined by the
Chief Justice and Justice Burton, dissented, desiring to apply the
8 332 U. S. 392, 396.
8 337 U. S. 293 (1949). (Finding the Clayton Act violated, the Court did not con-
sider the Sherman Act.)
10 The balance was sold through company owned stations or to industrial users. Of
the total gallonage sold in addition to Standard's 23%, 42.5% was sold by Standard's
six major competitors, the remaining 34.5% being divided among more than seventy
smaller companies. The Court concedes this is not a dominance case.
11 United States v. Standard Oil of California, 78 F. Supp. 850, 874 (1948).
12 337 U. S. 293, 314.
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comparative standard.'3 Justice Douglas in a special dissent noted
that the probable effect of the majority opinion would be to cause
the large oil companies to establish vast company-owned chains
of retail outlets in place of the independents-the "clerk" would
arise in place of the "resident proprietor"-and this was more to
be condemned than the exclusive contract.
Since the International Salt case concerned a tying agreement,
the court had to decide whether the same rule should apply to the
exclusive contract. As the majority conceded, there are significant
difrerences between the two. A tying agreement is inherently
monopolistic, benefiting few other than the vendor, and with little
excuse for its existence other than a desire to restrain trade. 4
Even without the Clayton Act such a clause is generally illegal.'
On the other hand an exclusive contract can be highly beneficial
to buyer, as well as seller, and capable of satisfying legitimate
economic needs. 6 As a buyer the contractor is assured a reliable
source of supply; he may protect himself against price fluctua-
tions, and can avoid storage costs and risks. The seller may min-
imize his expenses (in particular, salesmen's salaries) in addition
to being able to forecast his market." So pronounced are the dif-
ferences between the two contracts that it has been suggested that
different standards of legality be applied to each." Neverthele-s
1:1 C,,neding that the nunilsr of outlets and value of their sales "was sufficient to he
substantial."' he contended that "proof of quantity does not prove that they had this for-
bidden quality." Id. at 332.
1 It has sometimes been contended that tying clauses are necessary to preserve
.ood wilI :the reasoning being that the vendee might use defective materials and impair
the vendor's good will, or increase the vendor's duties if he were forced to repair. This
the courts usually reject by noting that adequate specifications could be drawn. Inter-
national Salt case, supra, note 6.
", Motion Pictures Patents Company v. Universal Film Manufacturing Company.
243 U. S. 502 (1917) ; Rose, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Section 3 of
the Clayton Act. 8 CEO. WAsit. L. REv.. 639, 658 1940).
16 Stockhausen. The Commercial and Anti-Trust Aspects of Term Requirements
Contracts, 23 N. Y. U. L. Q. Ruv., 412 (1948).
17 Id. at 413.
-s See comment. supra. note 3. As the author notes, an exclusive contract covering
more than one product could be equivalent to a tying agreement. A case with such a
contract should be examined to determine whether the seller has such extensive control
of one of the products as to be able to impose his will on the buyer.
[Vol. 3
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the majority in the principal case applied the quantitative stand-
ard on two grounds: (a) conceding such contracts to be eco-
nomically honest, Standard and its major competitors were in
the field first, and could collectively, even if not collusively, keep
out the newcomer; (b) at the most any judicial determination of
the economic effect of the contracts would be pure speculation.
Since there seems to be little reason for not considering the collec-
tive economic effect of the major sellers under the comparative
standard which the court declines to follow, tedious and indefinite
though that consideration would be, it would seem the first reason
is embraced in the second, i.e. that a result would be only a ju-
dicial guess.
For many years now our highest court has dwelt among such
phrases as "restraint of trade," "tend to create a monopoly," not
to mention the judicially added "rule of reason." Created in times
when single firms or groups of men controlled vast segments of an
industry, having reached their position generally by ruthless means,
the antitrust laws were designed to have lasting effect.19 This
prompted one judge to look upon the Sherman Act as a quasi-con-
stitution, a "charter of freedom" having "a generality and adapt-
ability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions."20 Thus the single, ruthless monopolist felt its sting
and has in large measure disappeared.2" In his place we have the
several mammoth firms, formed in "gentlemanly ways" as Doug-
las would say, bound together indirectly by considerations of
mutual interest.2" It would seem that to this pattern also, and to
subsequent patterns of trade restraint, our antitrust laws were
designed to apply.
Yet every decision which strikes down a trade practice as illegal
" Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose? 43 ILL. L. REV.,
745, 790 (1949).
2o Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U. S. 344, 359-360 (1933). See also
Chief Justice White in Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 62 (1910) where he
notes the flexible provision of the Sherman Act: ".... was expressly designed not to
unduly limit the application of the act by precise definition...."
21 Rostow, supra note 19 at 792.
22 Ibid. See pages 782 and 783 for an example of this sympathetic response.
1949]
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per se, without assuming the admittedly uncertain task of deter-
mining the effect of that practice on competition tends to make the
antitrust laws rigid and inadaptable. Certain practices, such as
price fixing,2" can be condemned because of their very nature.
Probably the same is true of tying agreements." As conceded by
the majority, an exclusive contract is not in the same category, yet
such contracts are now, in effect, declared illegal per se." While it
must be conceded that the Clayton Act requires a different stand-
ard from the Sherman Act,26 the difference is only one of degree.
It is to be hoped that the principal case does not represent the
beginning of a trend which may impair the flexible structure of
our antitrust laws.
Dean M. Gandy.
23 E.g., United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940).
24 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947). Justice Jackson
wrote that opinion, and in his dissent in the principal case, denys it has any application
to our problem.
25 "... I cannot agree that the requirements contract is per se an illegal one, and
that is the substance of what the Court seems to hold," said Justice Jackson in his dis-
sent, 337 U. S. at 323.
26 See United Shoe Machine Corporation v. United States, 258 U. S. 451, 459. The
exclusive contract, in the eyes of Congress, must have been a prima facie objectional
thing, and certainly little control coud exist over such contracts under the pre-Clayton
Act's "illusive limitation" of public policy. See Rose, supra, note 15. As Justice Frank-
furter notes, "We are faced ... with ... merely a broadly phrased qualification of an
Dtherwise narrowly directed statutory provision." 337 U. S. at 312.
